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This paper proposes the first test to monitor the behavior of dealers, in the foreign 
exchange (FX) market around the WMR (World Market Reuters) fixing window. The FX 
market is a decentralized market with dealers spread across the globe conducting trades 24 
hours a day. The around the clock trading poses a challenge to determining a daily closing 
price. Such a concept is needed for any entity that holds multi-currency portfolios1 to evaluate 
the value and performance of their holdings. The World Market Company (WM) in conjunction 
with Thomson Reuters launched the Closing Spot Rate Service, also known as the WMR Fix 
Rate or London Close, in January 1994. The WMR Fix Rate “has become a de facto standard 
for the closing spot rate” (FCA 2014b). Given the importance of this fix rate for a whole range 
of financial instruments and contracts, it has been a shock to the financial system and regulators 
to find out that the fix rate has been subject to manipulation. 2  The widespread scandal 
concerning the manipulation has led to heightened concerns as to the lack of regulatory 
oversight and weaknesses in the design of the FX market. 
Given the manipulation issue, the focus of the regulatory investigations and media 
attention has been on tracking trading activities for potential manipulation and collusive 
behavior (FCA 2014a; 2014b; 2014c; 2014d; Finch and Vaughan 2014). It is, however, costly 
for regulators to investigate and, therefore, effectively identifying potential investigation 
targets is itself an important task. With the rise of algorithmic and high-frequency trading 
within this market,3 the challenge facing regulators is the design of a method that can monitor 
and provide a timely warning signal that prompts further investigation. We aim to fill this void 
in the market microstructure literature by exploring the possibility of developing a monitoring 
system that can detect abnormal market behavior. 
The FX market is predominantly a quote driven market. 4  Dealers’ quotes are 
disseminated in real time across a few large platforms with Thomson Reuters being by far the 
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largest and most comprehensive.5 We accordingly collect and construct a unique tick-by-tick 
dataset from the Thomson Reuters platform that contains dealers’ high frequency bid and ask 
quotes. The most prominent feature of this dataset is that the identity and location of the quote 
disseminators are recorded. This allows us to observe closely how individual dealers contribute 
to price discovery around the WMR fixing at 4 o’clock (henceforth the fix). Our final dataset 
spans from 2nd April 2013 to 27th March 2014 and contains 87,447 quotes from EUR:GBP, 
EUR:JPY, EUR:USD, GBP:USD, and USD:JPY. These currencies are the most traded, liquid, 
and important currency pairs in the FX market, forming 77.65% of the $5.4 trillion a day FX 
trades (BIS 2013). 
We start our analysis of the abnormal behavior of dealers by understanding their 
“manipulative” objective functions when participating in the fixing process. The WMR 
benchmark fixing process is based on the median of the trade/quote prices within one minute 
centered at 4pm London time.6 Our procedure of capturing potential manipulation behavior is 
achieved in two phases. First, in the identification phase, we identify those quotes updates that 
are strategically and systematically contributing to moving the current median of the prices 
towards the final median of the prices in the fixing window. The idea is that before every quote 
update,  dealers examine the distribution of the posted quotes since the beginning of the fixing 
window and post their quotes so that it will move the median in towards the desired direction.7 
We count the number of such identified quote actions for each dealer and create a daily measure 
that we refer to as the ManIx.  
The second phase is statistical verification. The ManIx measure is, therefore, intended 
to capture a specific type of quoting behavior that is in line with the manipulation motive. 
However, it is possible that a dealer has a high ManIx by a random coincidence, when posting 
their quotes. In order to determine that the ManIx score for individual banks is capturing the 
strategic and systematic behavior of dealers, we examine the significance of the ManIx score 
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through bootstrap simulations. In our simulations, for a given fixing period, we change only 
one aspect of the dealers’ quotes, the timing. In other words, we maintain all dealers’ number 
of quotes and the quote movements, relative to the previous quote in the fixing window, while 
randomizing the sequence of their quotes in the fixing window. Such a design randomizes the 
dealers’ quotes with respect to the current median. If dealers’ quotes are not strategically 
conditional on the median of the quotes before their quotes, their ManIx measured from their 
realized quote should not be significantly different from the mean ManIx measure constructed 
from these bootstrap simulations.8 A significant realized ManIx compared to the bootstrap 
distribution would suggest that the realized ManIx is most likely to be due to systematic and 
strategic behavior.  
We identify 13 out of 69 dealer-locations in our dataset that have at least one realized 
ManIx score in one of the five currency-pairs that is significant at the 5% level when compared 
to the simulated scores. In order to verify the effectiveness and accuracy of our model in 
capturing realized manipulation, we conduct an extensive search of regulatory investigations 
and press releases for a full list of banks that have been investigated.9 We find that by mid 
December 2015, there are nine banks that have been investigated or sued by their investors and 
many cases are still on going. These investigations have led to a total of more than $11.8 billion 
of fines across the globe. In addition, more than 40 traders have been fired, suspended, put on 
leave, or resigned since the start of the investigations (McGeever 2014).  
 When we compare our identified list with the investigation list, we find that eight 
dealer-locations among the top identified banks sorted by the number of significant ManIx, 
have been either fined by regulators or have internal investigations. Among these banks, we 
identify four banks that have been heavily fined by regulators and these account for 68% ($8 
billion) of the total fines imposed by regulators and through court settlements. This confirms 
the power of the ManIx in capturing the abnormal behavior of banks that is of interest to 
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regulators. We implement ManIx method on March 2016 to observe whether there has been 
changes in the quotation behavior of dealers after the breakout of the scandal and the regulatory 
investigations. We show that ManIx demonstrates a decrease in its frequency of occurrence, 
on average, compared to the 2013-14 period. However, there are still some signs of significant 
ManIx that may be worth close monitoring by regulators.  
One of the important insights of the regulatory investigations is that the manipulators 
are not acting alone and collude via the sharing of information through chat rooms (Finch and 
Vaughan 2014; Ahmed 2014). Directly detecting and investigating such networks requires 
special access to information that is deemed to be private and confidential. Although ManIx is 
designed to capture the abnormal behavior of individual dealers, it is possible to use it to infer 
potential collusion through coordinated manipulation. To quantify the potential extent of 
collusion, we map out the coincidences of banks that have abnormal behavior in the same fixing 
period. In other words, by counting the number of days two banks have a significant ManIx 
score in the same currency pairs, we can identify potential collusion networks. Our analysis 
identifies that some networks exist that are of potential interest to regulators - there is, of course, 
a lack of public information to verify these findings at this stage. This analysis illustrates the 
potential application of ManIx in a network analysis context.  
Our research contributes to the market microstructure literature and regulation 
technology (RegTech) framework in the following ways. First, we address the challenge of 
monitoring the unregulated FX market through a novel algorithm that can serve as an 
automated timely warning system to regulators and banks. Our study extends the existing 
market microstructure literature on the WMR fix such as Evans (2018) who studies the 
behavior of 21 currency pairs around the WMR fix window.  He finds uncommon behavioral 
of the exchange rates around the fix that do not align with the prediction of microstructure 
models. We extend this line of enquiry by studying the motive of quotation around this period. 
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Traditional theoretical study on the market making activities normally assume dealers are risk 
natural and not interested in betting on the direction of the market (Kyle 1985; Glosten and 
Milgrom 1985).  Instead they post bid and ask quotes to attract volume of business and earn 
the spread accordingly. Our study emphasizes on the importance of taking into consideration 
the motivation of dealers in posting their bid and ask quotes by considering the direction of 
price movements. We show that this will provide further insight about dealers’ quotation 
behavior especially during a period that the prices have wider implications than only affecting 
the trades.   
Second, and more generally, our study contributes to the new debate on the response of 
regulators to the rapid changes in financial technology. The availability of big-data and high-
speed computing could create a new generation of regulatory technology; referred to as 
RegTech in a report by the UK Government (Government Office for Science 2015). We 
demonstrate, in the context of the FX market, that it is feasible to design an automated early 
warning/monitoring system.10 Our study also provides a first demonstration that by reverse 
engineering, it is possible to design a monitoring system for a fixing price process.  
Finally, this study constructs and uses a unique dataset that highlights the potential of 
quote data in demonstrating potential misbehavior in the FX market. We show how market 
monitoring is implementable by using quote data. Dealers who have manipulation intentions 
should have a cohesive strategy in both their trading and quoting, since most transactions 
originate from a quote.11 We identify potential manipulation behavior in the quote data that 
affects the quality of the WMR Fix price.  
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 discusses the background, 
motivation of this paper, and explains the structure of the FX market and our dataset. The 
methodology of WMR fix rate calculation and how and why the fix rate was manipulated is 
also presented in Section 2.  Section 3 explains the ManIx methodology and Section 4 presents 
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the results of implementing ManIx and compares our findings to media reports and regulatory 
investigations and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Background, Motivation and Data  
2.1. The Forex Market – A Quote Driven Market 
The FX market is a geographically dispersed, decentralized, quote driven, and primarily 
over the counter market (FSB 2014). Due to these attributes, there is not a single database that 
contains all the transactions conducted in this market. However, active dealers in the FX market 
disseminate the price that they are willing to trade on, in the form of indicative data (Goodhart 
and O'Hara 1997). Indicative quotes are disseminated on different platforms with the most 
important one being Thomson Reuters (Martens and Kofman 1998); more than 50% of all the 
electronic trading in the foreign exchange market occurs on the Reuters platform (Risk 2011) 
and the majority of the main players in the FX market disseminate their indicative quotes on 
this platform.  
In recent years, advances in communication technology have contributed to the 
integration of the FX market and enabled customers to access multi-pricing sources 
simultaneously. This has led to an increased share of electronic trading in the FX market, with 
90% of the trades in the FX spot market being conducted via electronic platforms. Though the 
overwhelming majority of the FX market trades occur on electronic platforms, there is not a 
single database that includes all the trades in this market. However, the vast majority of 
transactions in the FX market, conducted on an electronic platform, originate from a quote in 
two ways. First, a customer asks for a quote from a dealer or multiple dealers, simultaneously, 
for ask and bid prices for a specific size and subsequently accepts the desired side. Second, 
dealers stream a series of quotes, with predefined sizes. A trader could accept either side of a 
quote (ask or bid) and conduct a transaction (RBS 2014a; 2014b).12 In either of the situations, 
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a quote disseminated by a dealer is displayed on multiple electronic platforms, while a 
transaction is recorded merely on a single platform. Furthermore, a quote is disseminated with 
the identity of the disseminator, while transaction data do not include any identity information 
due to privacy reasons.  
Based on the aforementioned reasons, a comprehensive set of quotes with the identity 
of their disseminators, is the most adequate, available dataset to study the FX market, should 
the behavior of individual dealers be the focus of the analysis.  
2.2. The WMR Benchmark, Calculation, Manipulation, and Motivation  
In 1990 the World Markets (WM) Company, a small actuarial firm in Edinburgh, 
needed a single exchange rate for valuing the international portfolio of its pension fund clients. 
Until then a closing rate, published by Financial Times on the next day, was being used. The 
WM Company proposed their idea of producing a “carefully defined, cleaned, and screened 
benchmark” with Reuters (Willson-Taylor 2013). The FX Fix rate was introduced by the WM 
Company by using a Reuters’ data feed in 1994 (The WM Company 2015). The fix price, 
calculated by the WM, is the outcome of the median of the snapshots of ask and bid prices, 
independently and does not consider the size of the trades (Evans 2018). Over the fixing 
window the actual trades executed, and the bid and offer rates are sampled every second by 
WM. Where trade data are available, they will be used to generate bid and ask prices by 
applying the bid-ask spread at the time of the trade captured. For example, a public buy trade 
will be traded at the ask price; this trade price minus the bid-ask spread will produce the bid 
price at the time of the captured trade. The captured market data are subject to currency specific 
systematic tolerance checks that will identify outlying data. When the trade data are not 
sufficient or unavailable, quoted bid and ask data are used in the pool of calculation. After the 
finalization of the data capture, the medians of bid and ask prices are calculated and 
subsequently the mid-rate is formed based on these bid and ask medians. Finally, to obtain the 
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bid and offer price from the mid-rate, a minimum standard spread is applied to the mid-rate to 
calculate the new bid and ask price (The WM Company 2015). Therefore, these medians are 
the most prominent and fundamental elements in constructing the fix price. We conjecture that 
the manipulation of these medians is likely to lead to the manipulation of the fix price. 
The daily Fix rate produced by WM/Reuters at 4pm London time, also known as WMR 
Fix rate or London closing rate, “is by far the dominant benchmark being used, not just in FX, 
but also as a key input in multi-currency equity, bond, and credit indices” (FSB 2014). Due to 
the prominence of this benchmark and in response to the recent scandal in the FX Fix rate, HM 
Treasury in the UK has brought WMR and six other benchmarks “into the regulatory perimeter 
[to] enable close and continuous supervision by the UK regulators, as well as providing specific 
powers of enforcement against those that manipulate these benchmarks” (HM Treasury 
2015).13  
The Fix rate is used in a variety of financial benchmarks and by a majority of investment 
entities that invest globally such as asset managers (including ETFs and corporate end users), 
non-financial corporates, and index providers (FSB 2014). One of the reasons for the 
emergence and attractiveness of manipulating the fix rate is the process, at which trading at the 
fix price occurs, that allows firms to front-run their clients’ orders. Due to the growth in demand 
for trading at a fixed rate and a consequent increase in competition from banks for this business, 
FX dealers have increasingly agreed to buy from or sell to their clients at the mid-point fix 
price, rather than applying the spread. Prior to the determination of the mid-point fix price, 
clients place orders (with a predetermined currency, volume and direction) with a firm. The 
firm, by agreeing to transact with clients at the fix rate, that is yet to be determined, exposes 
itself to price movements at the fix.  In order to manage the risk of trading at the mid-point Fix 
rate, dealers attempt to manage their risk by trading before and around the fixing window. A 
firm with a net client order to buy (sell) at the fix will make profit if the rate that it buys (sells) 
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the currency is below the fix rate that it sells to its clients (FCA 2015). It is clear that the larger 
the size of a dealer’s clientele, the easier it will be, for the dealer, to ‘predict’ the direction of 
the price movement.  
The WMR Fix rate manipulation scandal that unfolded in 2014 shook the foundation 
of many banks. These investigations have resulted in the largest ever fines imposed by 
regulators on a group of banks (Ring and Vaughan 2014). The Bank of England fired its chief 
currency dealer, Martin Mallett, because of his failure to inform his superiors of the practice of 
sharing clients’ information by traders (Vaughan and Hamilton 2014). There have been many 
investigations and law suits since 2014. More details of these investigations are discussed in 
section 4.  
2.3. Data 
We start our investigation by constructing a unique high frequency dataset, accurate to 
a millisecond that contains dealers’ identities. We collected our dataset from the Thomson 
Reuters platform. Our dataset contains quotes from EUR:GBP, EUR:JPY, EUR:USD, 
GBP:USD, and USD:JPY. The dataset spans from April 2nd, 2013 to March 27th, 2014. There 
are 92 dealers from 5 continents, 42 countries and 49 cities that form 104 dealer-locations – of 
which 69 are active around the fixing window.  
Table 1 reports the descriptive statistics of our dataset of the one-minute fixing window: 
from 15:59:30.000 to 16:00:30.000. It contains 225 days with 87,447 quotes in total for all the 
five currency pairs. GBP:USD is the most active currency with an average of 92 quotes per 
day, within the fixing window, while USD:JPY is the least active with an average of 72 quotes 
per day. These statistics show that for all currency pairs more than one quote per second is 
disseminated that demonstrates the high frequency nature of these currency pairs.  
 




 For dealer information, the Dealers/Locations column depicts the total number of 
unique dealers/locations in our dataset. The reason for distinguishing between the branches of 
the same dealers in different locations is due to their different characteristics. For instance, the 
Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) has two branches, one in New York and one in London. The 
London branch is active from 8am to 4pm GMT time while the one in New York is active 
around the clock. In total, there are 69 unique dealer/locations across 37 cities in our dataset. 
For more information regarding the dealers, their locations, and the currency pairs they are 
active in, see the appendix.  
3. The Manipulation Intention Index (ManIx) 
To search and identify the potentially manipulative behavior of market participants, we 
begin by analyzing the objective of manipulative behavior. We note that the outcome of the 
manipulation is influenced by the fixing methodology. In order to calculate the fix price, WM 
Company captures snapshots of trades/quotes, for 60 seconds centered at 4pm GMT, at the 
interval of one second. Then after validation of the captured snapshots the medians of bid and 
ask prices are calculated and the minimum standard spread is applied to produce the final fix 
price (The WM Company 2015).14 Thus, a market participant who wishes to manipulate the 
fix rate should do so by manipulating the median price, since it is the most prominent element 
of the fix price calculation process.  
Since the fix rate calculation is based on the median of trades during the fixing window, 
traders who intend to manipulate the rate are aware that in order to put the highest possible 
pressure on the fix rate break their transactions into smaller trades (Vaughan et al 2013). 
Therefore, traders who intent to manipulate the fix are aware that placing large orders are less 
effective than breaking a large order to smaller orders. Furthermore, due to the validation 
process of the fix rate methodology and because the fix rate is calculated based on the median 
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of the prices not the average, traders are aware that extreme trades or quotes cannot impact the 
fix rate.  
By having these characteristics of the fix rate methodology and behavior of dealers 
around the fix rate, we design our algorithm accordingly. Our proposed method for identifying 
manipulative behavior consists of two phases, identification and statistical verification. The 
first phase, identification, identifies those quote updates that contributed to the movement of 
the current median towards the final median, where the current median is the median of the 
quotes since the start of the fixing period up to the current quote. The idea behind this phase is 
that for every quote update, if a dealer has manipulation intention, the dealer strives to move 
the median towards the intended direction. The second phase, statistical verification, 
determines whether the realized measures of manipulation intention are statistically significant.  
3.1. The Identification Phase 
Our proposed methodology identifies those quote updates that are contributing to the 
movement of the current median towards the final median, where the current median is the 
median of the quotes since the start of the fixing period up to the current quote. The idea behind 
our methodology is that for every quote update, if a dealer has manipulation intention, the 
dealer strives to move the median towards the intended direction. For successful manipulations, 
the realized medians would be a good proxy for dealers’ manipulation targets. Our 
methodology determines whether a set of quotes, disseminated by a dealer is placed 
strategically to move the Fix price. Specifically we have two conditions to classify each quote 
as a Potentially Manipulative Quote (PMQ): 
 𝐼𝐹 {
𝑆(𝐹𝑚 − 𝐶𝑚) ∗ 𝑆(𝑃𝑡 − 𝐶𝑚) = 1
𝒂𝒏𝒅
 𝑆(𝐹𝑚 − 𝐶𝑚) ∗ 𝑆(𝑃𝑡 − 𝑃𝑡−1) = 1
 
 
⇒  𝑃𝑀𝑄 = 1, 𝑜𝑡ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑤𝑖𝑠𝑒 𝑃𝑀𝑄 = 0 (1) 
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Where Fm, Cm, Pt, and Pt-1 are the final median, current median, the quote price at time 
t, and quote price at time t-1, respectively; final and current medians are the final median of 
the price in the fixing windows and the median up to the current quote, respectively; S(x) is the 
sign of x and is equal to +1, 0, and -1 when x is positive, zero, and negative, respectively. If 
PMQ is equal to 1 it means that the quote could potentially be manipulative and otherwise, if 
zero. By definition, the PMQ for the first quote is zero since there is no activity before it in the 
fixing window to compare it with.  
Formula (1) states that a manipulative quote is a quote that meets two conditions. First, 
the sign of the difference between the final and current median is equal to the sign of the 
difference between current price and the current median, we call it the location condition. This 
suggests that the new quoted price will move the current median towards the final median. 
Second, the sign of the difference between the final and current median is equal to the sign of 
the difference between the current price and the previous price, we call it the direction 
condition. This suggests that the direction of the latest quote is in the same direction as the 
intended median movement. The reason for this second condition is to capture a strong form 
of manipulative behavior. For example, when quoting to move the median down, a down tick 
quote is more likely to be so when the resulting latest quote is at a lower level for others to 
follow.15 To put it simply, formula (1) determines whether the current quote is moving the price 
towards the final median. 
The final step of the identification phase is constructing the ManIx score for a given 
fixing session. In order to do so, we aggregate the PMQ score of each dealer in each fixing 












Where ManIxi,j is the aggregated PMQ score for dealer i in day j, n is the number of all 
quotes in the fixing window j, and PMQk is the PMQ score for quote k. Di is a dummy variable 
equal to 1 when quote k belongs to dealer i and 0 otherwise.  
3.2. The Statistical Verification Phase 
The aim of this research is to develop a framework and a methodology that can identify 
manipulative behaviors within the WMR fixing window. Our methodology, ManIx, identifies 
which quotes strategically contribute to the final realization of the Fix rate. Such behavior, per 
se, is not necessarily a sign of manipulative behavior since it could be just a coincidence that 
the quote meets our specified condition in the course of price discovery. Strategically placing 
quotes in order to move it in a dealer’s desired direction and successfully doing so is a 
manipulative behavior. The question that needs addressing is how to differentiate the random 
from the systematic strategic behavior of a dealer. To this end, we design a bootstrap test for 
our ManIx statistics that maintains the same process of price discovery while examining the 
strategic placement of quotes to manipulate the fix rate.  
We run simulations that randomize dealers’ quoting sequences while maintaining their 
quoting characteristics (size and direction of the tick movement). Maintaining the number of 
quotes and the size of tick movement in their quotes control for the potential size effect and 
information effect that may affect the calculation of ManIx. For example, for a dealer who 
quotes more often, then it is more likely that they will have a false positive ManIx by chance. 
Comparing the realized ManIx with a bootstrap simulation that maintains such a property will 
control for such a potential bias.  
For each day, in each currency pair, we generate 10,000 series of randomized quotes. 
All of these randomized sequences have the same total price movement, and dealers maintain 
their number of quotes and the associated tick movements as the realized sequence in the fixing. 
The only thing that changes is the location of the dealers’ quotes in the overall sequence. After 
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generating these series, we calculate the simulated PMQ and ManIx scores for each dealer in 
that day.  
The design of this verification is to differentiate a dealer’s contribution to price 
discovery from manipulation. The simulated sequences will maintain the same level of 
contribution to price discovery (the total number of ticks that a dealer would have moved the 
price) while the timing of the contribution is different. In these simulated sequences, there will 
be quotes that have PMQ equal to 1 but are due to randomness. The assumption is that if a 
dealer is making quotes to time the market so that the median will move towards an intended 
direction, their realized ManIx for that fixing session will be at the right tail of the ManIx 
distribution generated from the 10,000 randomized quote sequences; otherwise, the realized 
ManIx will be indistinct from that of the randomized sequences. The point that should be 
emphasized here is that each dealer’s original ManIx score is compared with its own simulated 
ManIx score generated from the 10,000 randomized sequences. In other words, each dealer’s 
ManIx score is compare to its own simulated ManIx score, not other dealers. This comparison 
in this manner controls for the number of quotes (market share) of the dealer and size effect.  
 To exemplify the process of the verification phase, consider the following example. 
Assume five quotes, Q1 to Q5, are disseminated by three dealers, A, B, and C and the sequence 
of the quotes is given in Table 2. Panel A, demonstrates the original quote series. The subscripts 
for a dealer demonstrate the sequence of price for that dealer. We start the randomized sequence 
by keeping the first quote the same as the original sequence, in order to maintain the start and 
finish prices for all the sequences to be the same as the original one. For instance, Panel B 
shows an illustration of our randomization.  Q1 to Q5 are randomized as Q1, Q5, Q2, Q3, and 
Q4.   In order to rebuild the price series after randomization, we apply the price change of the 
quote in the sequence. For example, the second quote in the randomized series is Q5, which 
was B2 in the original quote. The corresponding price change for B2 was “-0.1”. Therefore, 
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the price in the randomized series will be the previous price plus the corresponding change, 
which is equal to 1.8 + (-0.1) = 1.7.  Notice that the total contribution to price discovery of each 
dealer is maintained.  For example, for dealer B their total contribution to price discovery is 
zero in both panels (0.1 + (-0.1) = 0).  What is different is the timing of these contributions to 
the sequence.  If the timing is strategic to manipulate the fixing, a randomization will remove 
this effect and, therefore, reduce the possibility of generating a positive ManIx signal in the 
randomization.  
For each day, in each currency pair, we generate 10,000 series of randomized quotes. 
After generating these series, we calculate the PMQ and ManIx scores for each of the dealers 
in that day. To determine whether a dealer’s quoting behavior was a result of random or 
strategic quoting, we identify where the original ManIx score lies within the simulated ManIx 
scores distribution. If the original ManIx score lies within the first top 5% of the simulated 
ManIx score histogram, the behavior of the dealer on that day is classified as manipulative, 
otherwise it is classified as random or non-manipulative.  
 
[Table 2 Here] 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a simulation distribution for ask price of RBS (New York branch) 
on 21st June 2013 for the GBP:USD currency pair with the realized ManIx score of 17. Out of 
the 10,000 simulated ManIx scores, only 0.92% of them are larger or equal to the realized 
ManIx score by the dealer on the day. In other words, the original ManIx score, realized by the 
dealer, lies within the top 5% of the simulated ManIx distribution of the dealer and, 
consequently, we identify the dealer’s ask quotes as manipulative.  
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 17 
 
4. Results and Discussion  
4.1. An Overview of Fix Rate Discovery 
Table 3 reports the daily distribution of the average PMQ per quote. For each day, the 
average PMQ is calculated for each currency pair using all quotes. Such per quote averages 
give an idea of the frequency of quotes that are captured as potentially manipulative by the 
ManIx. Panel A shows that on average the number of quotes that are deemed to be potentially 
manipulative range from 13 (11) to 22 (21) percent for the Ask (Bid) price. For instance, the 
daily mean of the average PMQ per quote is 0.1334 for EUR:GBP. This means that on average, 
almost, 1 out of 7.5 quotes coincide with our manipulation definition.16  
 
[Table 3 Here] 
4.2. ManIx and Regulatory Investigations 
Table 4, panel A, reports the dealers with significant ManIx that are identified as 
manipulator after verification phase. If the realized ManIx score lies within the top 5% of the 
simulated ManIx score, the dealer’s behavior in that day is classified as manipulative, otherwise 
it is classified as random or non-manipulative. The highlighted dealers are the dealers that are 
also identified by regulatory investigations as manipulators. In terms of the EUR:GBP, 
EUR:JPY, EUR:USD, GBP:USD, and USD:JPY currency pairs we identify 7, 6, 5, 7, and 3 
dealers, respectively, who exhibited manipulative behavior. The number of days that dealers 
have manipulated the market varies amongst the dealers.17 In all the currency pairs, Barclays 
and the Royal Bank of Scotland, both London and New York branches, Rabobank, and Societe 
Generale demonstrate considerably greater manipulative behavior than other dealers.  
Table 4, panel A, raises two questions. The first question is that whether the identified 
dealers as manipulators are the dealers that have higher quote activity. Table 4, panel B, shows 
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in general this the case. For example, the most active dealer in these currency pairs (RBS-NYC) 
has the highest frequency of manipulative behavior. The second question is whether dealers’ 
quoting activity changes before and within the fixing period. To answer this question, we 
calculate the average number of quotes per minute for each dealer and in total from15:30 to 
15:58 refereeing to as non-fix period18 and compare it with the average number of quotes in 
the fixing window. The highlighted cells in panel B show that a dealer’s average quoting 
frequency statistically significantly changes before and within the fixing window. This is 
mainly the case for the dealers who are identified as manipulators in panel A. 
 Overall, out of 69 dealers in our dataset, 32 dealers exhibit different quoting behavior 
before and within the fixing window. However, the behavior change is not always only increase 
in dealers’ quoting frequency. There are instances that some dealers reduce their quoting 
frequency within the fixing window relative to the period before it. This finding serves as some 
evidence of intent to manipulate the fix rate; however, this is neither sufficient nor necessary. 
This evidence further demonstrates the need for development of ManIx algorithm. Finally, the 
total row in panel B, demonstrates the average number of quotes per minute from15:30 to 15:58 
and the fixing window. In line with Evans (2018) finding, for all currency pairs we observe a 
statistically significant increase in number of quotes in fixing window relative to the period 
before. 
Table 4, panel A, provides a short list that can guide regulators in their potential 
investigations of manipulation. How can this list be verified and, therefore, provide evidence 
for the validity of our methodology? It is unlikely to be able to identify manipulation using 
publicly available data (even ex-post) as we discussed earlier, and this is one of our motivations 
behind developing ManIx. The manipulative behavior can only be identified and confirmed 
through detailed investigation with access to private trade and chat records. Such investigations 
are costly to both regulators and banks and, therefore, if ManIx can act as an effective 
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monitoring system it will help direct the limited regulatory resource to more targeted 
investigations. To validate our measure, we compile a table of banks that have been 
investigated and fined.  
Table 5 reports a collection of fines imposed on to the banks following the 
investigations and law suits around the globe. It shows that most of the investigations have 
happened in the UK and US. For example, the UK’s Financial Conduct Authority (FCA) fined 
five banks $1.7 billion for manipulating the WMR benchmark in November 2014 and Barclays 
$441 in May 2015 (FCA 2014e; 2015).19  In the US, the Commodity and Future Trading 
Commission (CFTC) fined five banks: Citibank, HSBC, JPMorgan, RBS, and UBS a total of 
$1.4 billion in November 2014 and Barclays for $400 million in May 2015 (CFTC 2014; 2015).  
 
[Table 4 Here] 
[Table 5 Here] 
The regulatory investigations are being followed by lawsuits from investors against 
involved banks in WMR fix rate manipulation. In a lawsuit brought by the Scott and Scott law 
firm against involved banks: Barclays, RBS, and UBS settled with their investors for $384 
million, $255 million, and $135 million, respectively (Kleinman 2015; Kennedy 2015). In 
addition, the Scott and Scott law firm brought a lawsuit against Societe Generale for its role in 
manipulating the WMR Fix rate (Voris 2015). In addition, more than 40 traders have been 
fired, suspended, put on leave, or resigned since the start of the investigations (McGeever 
2014). 
Comparing the list of banks being fined by regulators to our identified list, we have two 
important observations. First, we identify four out of the top five banks that have been heavily 
fined by regulators. The exception is JP Morgan who is more active on the EBS platform and 
not featured in our Thomson Reuter’s database.20  Economically, 68% ($8 billion) of the 
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regulator fines are from the top 8 banks that have been identified by ManIx in Table 4. If the 
regulators focused their investigations on our identified list, they would have covered the major 
suspects. Importantly, having such a monitoring system in place would speed up the response 
of investigators to potential manipulation as a timely signal would be generated by the ManIx. 
Second, although some banks were not investigated by regulators, they conducted their own 
internal investigations into the attempted manipulation of the WMR fix rates by their 
employees. In May 2014, Commerzbank AG, Germany’s second largest lender, fired one FX 
trader and suspended another one on suspicions of the attempted manipulation of the Polish 
zloty's euro exchange rate (Schuetze and McGeever 2014). Rabobank that was fined $974 
million during 2014 for manipulating interest rates, suspended two senior FX traders, Gary 
Andrews and Chris Twort, employees of the bank since 2004 and 2010, respectively (Van Gaal 
and Choudhury 2014). The New York State regulator, subpoenaed Societe Generale in 
December 2014, a month after US, UK and Swiss regulators concluded their probe into the 
rigging of the FX rate (Saks-McLeod 2015).  
Overall, the media reports and regulatory findings discussed above confirm that the 
banks highlighted by our monitoring methodology have been investigated by regulators. This 
supports the notion that our monitoring methodology aligns with the actions of regulators and 
should provide value because of its time and cost-effective design. Our methodology, however, 
also signals potential manipulative behavior by banks that have not been investigated. Whether 
these are false positives in our estimation or a lapse in regulatory activity is open to question 
and can only be clarified by further regulatory investigation in the future. 
4.3. Out of Sample Test 
One interesting question to ask is what has happened to the quotation behavior of 
dealers after the breakout of the scandal and especially the regulatory investigations.  Two main 
structural changes have taken place.  First, from February 2015, the fixing period has changed 
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from 60 seconds to 300 seconds. Second, there are more dealers involved in the fixing window 
in 2016 than was the case for 2013 and 2014. To demonstrate the application in this new 
environment, Table 6 reports the results of ManIx for the period from the 2nd March to 30th 
March 2016. 
[Table 6 Here] 
 
Table 6 shows there are some significant results. Particularly, RBS and Rabobank have 
the highest number of significant days.  In order to compare these results with those of 2013-
14, since there are different number of days and dealers in the two periods, we calculate the 
total number of dealer-days for each currency pair for each period. By dividing the total number 
of identified events (significant ManIx) in each currency by the total number of dealer-days, 
we can observe the occurrence of the frequency of manipulation. By comparing the columns 
event per dealer-day (E/DD) in Table 7 we can ascertain if the frequency has changed between 
the periods 2013-14 and March 2016. 
 
[Table 7 Here] 
 
Table 7 shows the results of comparing the frequency of manipulative behavior by 
dealers in 2013-14 and 2016 periods. With the exceptions of the EUR:GBP and USD:JPY 
currency pairs, there is a reduction in the frequency of significant ManIx occurrence. After the 
change in the fix rate calculation and the exhaustive investigations by regulators, ManIx shows 
a decrease in its frequency of occurrence on average. Nevertheless, there are still some signs 
of significant ManIx that may be worth close monitoring by regulators. 
After February 2015 the increase in the length of fixing window from 60 seconds to 
300 seconds may deter manipulation as it is more difficult to influence the ultimate benchmark 
fixed rate. There can be an argument that no new algorithm is required and the small number 
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of identified dealers in table 6 might be false positive. However, there is always a need for a 
monitoring algorithm such as ManIx, specifically with the growth of high frequency traders in 
the FX market. While the fix rate manipulation was done by human traders and identified by 
their communication, identification of algorithmic manipulation will be more difficult.  
 
4.4. Network Analyses – Signs of Collusion 
One of the arguments for not regulating the FX market is that given its size and 
competition, it is less than likely that any one bank can manipulate this market. Manipulating 
the fix rate requires a considerable amount of capital and coordination between colluding 
traders. For example, some traders disclosed to Bloomberg news that they would need more 
than €200 million to have a possibility of moving the fix rate (Vaughan et al, 2013). 
Furthermore, the manipulation could “backfire” if another party enters the market with a large 
order in the opposite direction. Indeed, there is the suggestion that the manipulators are not 
acting alone and collude via the sharing of information through chatrooms (Ahmed 2014; Finch 
and Vaughan 2014). However, directly detecting and investigating such networks requires 
special access to information that is deemed to be private and confidential. 
Three methods of collusion can be deduced from the regulators’ findings (FCA 2014d). 
First, traders transfer all the orders to one trader who executes the orders in the collective 
desired direction. Second, traders transfer their orders to two or more traders and these traders 
join forces and third, trading with dealers out of the network by giving them orders to trade in 
the desired direction. Since in the first case scenario the manipulation is conducted merely by 
one dealer, it is not possible to identify the network of dealers behind the manipulation with 
the existing data. The second and third methods suggest that the collusion will have a trail of 
coordination in the trading activity. While our ManIx measure is designed to capture 
manipulative intention on a quote by quote basis, examining all dealers’ quotes in the same 
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fixing window will flag up potential collusion networks. To this end, we draw network graphs 
of banks that have significant manipulative behavior in a same fixing window.  
When identifying the list of potential manipulative banks, we apply a strong statistical 
criterion of 5% significance in identifying the significant ManIx. This produces the short and 
focused list of banks in Table 4. However, in order to identify potential collusion effects, we 
choose a more relaxed criterion of 10% significance when identifying individual significant 
ManIx. This follows the logic that when banks collude to achieve manipulation, the act of 
manipulation will be less obvious in each individual bank. These network graphs are reported 
in Figure 2. Any two banks that have a significant ManIx on the same day21 for a given pair of 
currency will have a connection value of one. We count all these connections for all dealers in 
each fixing. The lines and their colors show the connections and direction of manipulation, 
respectively, while the size of each node shows its prominence in the network.  
The network analyzes in Figure 2 demonstrate three features of such networks. First, 
there can be a large network of interconnected banks. For example, this is illustrated in Panels 
A and C. They show that a large number of banks are interconnected by their manipulated 
behaviors. For example, in Panel A for the EUR:GBP currency pair, there has been suspected 
collusion between four banks: Rabobank, Danske Bank, CIBC, and Barclays. Second, there 
can be more than one network identified. This is illustrated in Panels B, D and E. This 
fragmentation demonstrates that not all the manipulators are connected. Finally, some banks 
are found to play a dominant role in the network. For example, Barclays has a centrality and a 
prominent role with the highest number of connecting banks in Panel A for the EUR:GBP 
currency pair. Similarly, RBS-NYC has played the central role in the EUR:JPY, EUR:USD 
and GBP:USD currency pairs, while RBS-LON plays the central role in the USD:JPY currency 
pair. 
[Figure 2 Here] 
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In the regulators’ investigative findings (discussed in Section 4) the individual banks 
who manipulated the fix rate were identified. However, there was very little mention as to 
which banks colluded over which currencies. Therefore, verification of our findings in this 
section based on the regulators’ findings or media reports is not possible. The only chatroom 
members identified by regulators are “The Cartel” chatroom that consisted of traders from JP 
Morgan, UBS, and Citigroup (Finch and Vaughan 2014). However, this chatroom was not the 
only existing network of manipulators and there existed different chatrooms with names such 
as “The A Team”, “The 3 Musketeers”, and “The Players” (Ahmed, 2014). The network 
analysis presented here is, however, a way to detect potential collusive behavior and it could 
be a toolkit for regulators and banks to further target the investigation of collusion. 
5. Conclusion 
The WMR benchmark rate is important for a number of financial instruments and 
markets, and its seemingly extensive manipulation has given rise to a lot of regulatory 
‘interest’. The problem facing regulators in tackling this issue in a timely and effective manner 
is having data and a methodology that identifies potential manipulation as it progresses. In 
response to this issue we construct a dataset based on quotes and develop an index (ManIx) 
that is able to capture the intended manipulation of the benchmark rate. We identify banks that 
are prone to potential manipulative behavior and use ex post regulator investigation data to 
verify our findings. Essentially, we provide a warning system that will help regulators and FX 
market participants to keep up with the speed and size of the FX market in order to conduct 
their monitoring and investigative activities.   
The exercise of developing an automatic monitoring system is of great importance to 
regulators given the rapid increase of speed in the financial markets. Having an automatic 
monitoring system will help regulators to allocate their limited resources to timely 
investigations. We demonstrate the feasibility of developing such a regulation technology and 
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test its effectiveness. Our out of sample analysis provides some evidence of improvement in 
the fixing quality after the regulators’ investigation and the adjustment of the fixing 
methodology. Nevertheless, there are still some signs of significant ManIx that may be worth 
close monitoring by regulators.  The limitation of the current study is the unavailability of 
transaction data with identity; however, such data can only be made available via requests from 
regulators. Finally, the application of this technology is not confined to foreign exchange rate 
fixing. For example, it can be applied to securities data to identify manipulation near the close 
of day trading. This is potentially important in days when the closing price has important 




Appendix – Active Dealers, Their Locations and the Number of Quotes during the 
Fix 
  
Panel A. Active Dealers in Africa 
Name Country City €:£ €:¥ €:$ £:$ $:¥ 
ABSA BANK SOUTH AFRICA JOHANNESBURG     11     
NEDBANK SOUTH AFRICA JOHANNESBURG       2,522   
Panel B. Active Dealers in Asia 
Name Country City €:£ €:¥ €:$ £:$ $:¥ 
AL HILAL BANK UAE ABU DHABI     4 4   
ASYA KATILIM BANKASI A.S TURKEY ISTANBUL     53 59   
BANK MUSCAT SAUDI ARABIA RIYADH     8 5   
BANK OF COMMUNICATION CHINA SHANGHAI  41 44   41 43 
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL 
BANK OF CHINA 
HONG KONG HONG KONG     12 9 11 
ING BANK TURKEY ISTANBUL       811   
KASPI BANK KAZAKHSTAN ALMATY     383 388 353 
NATIONAL BANK OF OMAN OMAN MUSCAT     7 7 6 
OMAN ARAB BANK OMAN MUSCAT     8   6 
PROMSVYAZ BANK RUSSIA MOSCOW     14     
QATAR ISLAMIC BANK QATAR DOHA     497     
YAPI KREDI BANK TURKEY ISTANBUL     6 210   
Panel C. Active Dealers in Australia 
Name Country City €:£ €:¥ €:$ £:$ $:¥ 
LLOYDS BANK AUSTRALIA SYDNEY 45         
WESTPAC BANK AUSTRALIA SYDNEY 71 88 59 89 72 
Panel D. Active Dealers with Multiple Location 
Name Country City €:£ €:¥ €:$ £:$ $:¥ 
AUSTRALIA AND NEW ZEALAND 
BANKING GROUP 
GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 1         
BANQUE INTERNATIONALE A 
LUXEMBOURG 
GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 3 2 1     
BARCLAYS GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 1,336 1,105   799 677 
DEUTSCHE BANK AG LONDON GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 149 7 82 2 1 
GOLDMAN SACHS 
INTERNATIONAL 
GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 15 7 5 6 2 
HSBC GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 24   6 3   
HSBC BANK USA GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 11   2 1   
KBC GROUP GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 2 686   318 601 
NATIONAL AUSTRALIA BANK GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX     3     
NEDBANK GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX     84 156 4 
SOCIETE GENERALE GLOBAL FOREX GLOBAL FOREX 69   383 192 12 
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Panel E. Active Dealers in America 
Name Country City €:£ €:¥ €:$ £:$ $:¥ 
BANK OF MONTREAL-BANQUE 
DE MONTREAL 
CANADA MONTREAL     54 107 56 
Brown Brothers Harriman & Co U.S.A NEW YORK   311 291 289 288 
RADA FOREX U.S.A NEW YORK   9   1 4 
RBS U.S.A NEW YORK 4,045 4,244 4,426 4,460 4,144 
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA 
BANK 
U.S.A NEW YORK 286     386   
THE BANK OF NEW YORK 
MELLON 
U.S.A NEW YORK     546 755 564 
INTERCAM BANK MEXICO MEXICO CITY     4 236   
Panel F. Active Dealers in Europe 
Name Country City €:£ €:¥ €:$ £:$ $:¥ 
ALLIED IRISH IRELAND DUBLIN  427 513 342 498 330 
BANCA AKROS ITALY MILAN 217 224 116 265 259 
BANCA MONTE DEI PASCHI DI 
SIENA 
ITALY MILAN 32 34 22     
BANCO COMMERCIAL 
PORTUGUES SA 
PORTUGAL LISBON   1,517       
BANCO DE SABADELL SPAIN SABADELL 244 257 172     
BANCO POPOLARE ITALY BERGAMO 252 259 148 210   
BANCPOST SA ROMANIA BUCHAREST       125   
BANK BPH SA POLAND WARSAW 58   61 74 63 
CAIXA GERAL DE DEPOSITOS PORTUGAL LISBON 69 72   4   
CANADIAN IMPERIAL BANK OF 
COMMERCE CIBC 
CANADA TORONTO 402 501   572   
CITIBANK CZECH REPUBLIC PRAGUE     1,768     
COMMERZBANK GERMANY FRANKFURT 946 860 979 1,058 695 




LONDON         1,491 
DANSKE BANK DENMARK COPENHAGEN  781 696 328 347 268 
DBS BANK HONG KONG HONG KONG     761   850 
DEN NORSKE BANK NORWAY OSLO     1 9 13 
DIE ERSTE OESTERR. SPAR-
CASSE BANK 




LONDON     313 50   
I.C.M. INVESTMENTBANK AG ITALY MILAN     140     
INDUSTRIAL AND COMMERCIAL 
BANK OF CHINA 
UNITED 
KINGDOM 
LONDON     261     
INTESA SANPAOLO BANK ITALY MILAN 347 342 324 340   
LANDESBANK BADEN-
WÜRTTEMBERG 



















NORDEA BANK DENMARK COPENHAGEN  245 316 284 318 303 
PALATINE BANK AND TRUST FRANCE PARIS 8 14 12 11 10 
PIRAEUS BANK GREECE ATHENS 72 76 49     




LONDON 816 133 562 587 603 




LONDON 2,070 1,624 2,765 2,552 1,983 
SANTANDER SPAIN MADRID 224 9   209   
SKANDINAVISKA ENSKILDA 
BANK 
SWEDEN STOCKHOLM 756 413     738 
SOCIETE GENERALE FRANCE PARIS 576 857 677   264 
UBS SWITZERLAND ZURICH 368 385 378 375 306 
WGZ BANK GERMANY DÜSSELDORF 912 925 815 927   
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Tables and Figures 
Table 1- Dataset Summary Statistics  
 
Currency Days Sum Mean Min Max STD Dealers Locations Dealers/Locations 
EUR:GBP 212 16,156 76.21 48 122 13.28 36 22 38 
EUR:JPY 216 16,825 77.89 55 108 10.76 33 21 34 
EUR:USD 215 18,571 86.38 48 127 14.42 49 31 52 
GBP:USD 224 20,672 92.29 44 144 16.14 44 28 47 
USD:JPY 210 15,223 72.49 36 118 13.35 33 18 34 
Total 225 87,447 388.65    64 37 69 
 
This table reports the descriptive statistics of our dataset of the one minute fixing window: from 
15:59:30.000 to 16:00:30.000 between April 2nd, 2013 to March 27th 2014. We collected our dataset from the 
Thomson Reuters platform. The Days column shows the number of days that we were able to capture the 
data without any interruption. The Sum, Mean, Min, Max, and STD columns report the total, average, 
minimum, maximum and standard deviation of the number of quotes in the one minute fixing window, 
respectively. The Dealers and Locations columns depict the total number of distinct dealers and 
locations that are active within the fixing window in our dataset, respectively. The Dealers/Locations 
column depicts the total number of unique dealers/location in our dataset. 
 
Table 2 – Randomization process 
 
Panel A – Original Price Series 
Quote Q1 Q2 Q3 Q4 Q5 
Price 1.8 1.9 2.1 1.7 1.6 
Dealer A1 B1 A2 C1 B2 
Change 0 0.1 0.2 -0.4 -0.1 
Panel B – Randomized Price Series 
Quote Q1 Q5 Q2 Q3 Q4 
Price 1.8 1.7 1.8 2.0 1.6 
Dealer A1 B2 B1 A2 C1 
Change 0 -0.1 0.1 0.2 -0.4 
 
This table exemplifies the process of the verification phase and how the randomized sequence of prices 
is generated while maintaining the same price discovery process. Panel A shows the original price series 





Table 3 – PMQ Summary Statistics 
 
    Average PMQ Ask  Average PMQ Bid 









EUR:GBP 212 0.1334 0.1343 0.1014 0 0.4111  0.1314 0.1149 0.0920 0 0.3623 
EUR:JPY 216 0.2194 0.2298 0.1035 0 0.4247  0.2042 0.2051 0.0990 0 0.4267 
EUR:USD 215 0.1499 0.1429 0.0905 0 0.3697  0.1481 0.1481 0.0887 0 0.4118 
GBP:USD 224 0.2099 0.2215 0.0956 0 0.3910  0.1903 0.1971 0.0988 0 0.4235 
USD:JPY 210 0.1456 0.1419 0.0808 0 0.3614  0.1479 0.1421 0.0894 0 0.3500 
 
This table reports the average portion of quotes in day that have obtained PMQ equal to 1. Column N 
represents the number of days available in our dataset for a currency pair. Mean, Median, Std Dev, Min, 











 Table 4 – Dealers with Manipulative (Significant Abnormal) Activities during Fixing and Their Quoting Behavior 
Panel A. Identified Dealers With Manipulative Behavior  
 EUR:GBP EUR:JPY EUR:USD GBP:USD USD:JPY Sum 
Dealer Location CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid CTotal CAsk CBid  
1 RBS NYC 207 5 3 211 6 7 211 6 3 219 13 8 205 3 4 58 
2 RBS LON 196 4 5 198 4 4 198 1 9 203 11 10 197 2 5 55 
3 BARCLAYS GFX 212 0 2 194 2 2    223 0 1    7 
4 RABOBANKGFM LON 162 0 1 44 1 0       162 1 1 4 
5 SOC GENERALE PAR 200 1 0 215 0 2 211 0 1       4 
6 UBS ZUR          212 1 1    2 
7 CITIBANK PRG       209 0 2       2 
8 COMMERZ BANK FFT 211 1 0       223 1 0    2 
9 KBC GFX    159 2 0          2 
10 BK MONTREAL MON          29 1 1    2 
11 BANCA AKROS MIL          150 1 0    1 
12 ICBC LON       73 1 0       1 
13 WGZ BANK DUS 115 0 1             1 
 
  
Total  11 12  15 15  8 15  28 21  6 10 141 
Panel B. Identified Dealers Average Quoting Frequency per Minute Within and Before Fixing Window 
 EUR:GBP EUR:JPY EUR:USD GBP:USD USD:JPY  
Dealer Location Fix Non-Fix Fix Non-Fix Fix Non-Fix Fix Non-Fix Fix Non-Fix  
1 RBS NYC 19.54 11.59 20.11 16.81 20.98 14.63 20.37 14.23 20.21 14.41  
2 RBS LON 10.56 4.05 8.20 5.80 13.96 6.96 12.57 4.89 10.07 6.42  
3 BARCLAYS GFX 6.30 4.98 5.70 4.66   3.58 2.90 3.25 2.78  
4 RABOBANK LON 5.04 3.34 3.02 3.10 3.41 3.18 3.35 3.14 3.72 3.24  
5 SOC GENERALE PAR 2.88 2.10 3.99 3.21 3.21 2.70   2.84 2.56  
6 UBS ZUR 1.77 1.70 1.80 1.81 1.80 1.78 1.77 1.74 1.59 1.61  
7 CITIBANK PRG     8.46 5.91      
8 COMMERZ BANK FFT 4.48 4.16 4.02 3.44 4.57 4.65 4.74 4.26 3.33 3.12  
9 KBC GFX 1.00 1.62 4.31 3.64   2.47 2.31 3.80 3.06  
10 BK MONTREAL MON     2.08 2.84 3.69 4.19 2.07 2.85  
11 BANCA AKROS MIL 1.55 1.32 1.64 1.68 1.33 1.17 1.77 1.53 1.79 1.77  
12 ICBC LON     3.58 3.64      
13 WGZ BANK DUS 7.93 7.49 7.91 7.74 7.09 7.02 7.66 7.07    
 Total 76.21 54.90 77.89 69.29 86.38 70.25 92.29 76.67 72.49 59.05  
Panel A reports a list of dealer-locations that are identified by the verification process to have a significant ManIx score at 5% level.  Columns CBid and CAsk report the number of days a dealer’s ManIx measures are significant 
for the Bid and Ask prices, respectively. The shaded rows indicate banks that are featured in regulatory investigations, summarized in Table 5. CAsk, and CBid columns, in the total row, at the bottom of the table, show the total 
number of times that ask and bid price have been manipulated, respectively. Panel B reports the daily average number of quote for each dealer within and before the fixing window, from 15:30:00.000 to 15:58:59.999. The 
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highlighted cells in gray shows that a dealer’s averages number of quotes is significantly different within and before the fixing window. The data, for panel B, is obtained from Thomson Reuters Eikon and spans from April 2nd, 





Table 5 – Investigations, Law Suits and Fines 
 
Country  U.K. Swiss United States of America Total 
Sources 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8  




Banks          
BARCLAYS 441  400  650 342 485 384 2,702 
CITI 358  310 350 925 342   2,285 
JP MORGAN 352  310 350 550 342  99.5 2,004 
RBS 344  290  395 274  255 1,558 
UBS 371 139 290  203 342  135 1,480 
HSBC 343  275     285 903 
BOA    250  205  180 635 
BNP PARIBAS        
249 249 GOLDMAN 
SACHS 
       
Total 2,209 139 1,875 950 2,723 1,847 485 1,588 11,816 
 
This table reports a collection of fines imposed on the banks following the investigations and law suits. 
The data are collected from various regulatory press releases and news disclosures. Since some 
investigations are still on going, this table covers all announcements up to December 2015. The fines 
are reported in millions of dollars. FCA: Financial Conduct Authority, FINMA: Swiss Financial Market 
Supervisory Authority, CFTC: Commodity Futures Trading Commission, OCC: office of the 
comptroller of the currency, DOJ: Department of Justice, Fed: Federal Reserve, N.Y.D.F.S: New York 
State Department of Financial Services, Scott + Scott: Scott and Scott LLP Law Firm. The shaded rows 
indicate banks that are identified in Table 4. Sources of the fines are FINMA (2015), OCC (2014), FCA 
(2014 e; 2015), CFTC (2014; 2015), DOJ (2015), Fed (2015), NYDFS (2015), Scott and Scott (2015). 
Table 6 – Dealers with Manipulative Activities during Fixing 
 
    EUR:GBP EUR:JPY EUR:USD GBP:USD USD:JPY Sum 
Dealer Location CT CA CB CT CA CB CT CA CB CT CA CB CT CA CB   
RBS LON 19 1 1 19 0 1         19 0 1 4 
Rabobank LON 18 0 2     19 0 1 18 0 1     4 
Barclays LON 20 0 1 20 1 0              2 
BNY Mellon NYC                  18 1 0  1 
Total   20 1 4 20 1 1 20 0 1 20 0 1 20 1 1 11 
 
This table reports a list of dealer-locations that are identified by the simulations to have 
manipulative/significant-abnormal activity in March 2016. If the realized ManIx score is significant at 
the 5% level given the simulated ManIx distribution from the 10,000 simulations, the dealer’s behavior 
in that day is classified as manipulative - otherwise it is classified as random or non-manipulative. This 
table reports the total number of days a dealer participates in the fixing and the number of days their 
ManIx measures are significant for the Bid and Ask prices. Columns CT, CA, and CB demonstrate the 





Table 7 – Frequency of Manipulation Occurrence 
 
 2013-2014 2016 
Currency Dealer-Day Events E/DD Dealer-Day Events E/DD 
EUR:GBP 3,982 23 0.58% 384 5 1.30% 
EUR:JPY 3,895 30 0.77% 381 2 0.52% 
EUR:USD 4,276 23 0.54% 415 1 0.24% 
GBP:USD 4,653 49 1.05% 390 1 0.26% 
USD:JPY 3,404 16 0.47% 317 2 0.63% 
Total 20,210 141.00 0.70% 1887.00 11.00 0.58% 
 
This table reports the frequency of the occurrence of significant ManIx for the 2013-14 and 2016 
periods. The column Dealer-Day shows the total number of dealers who have been active in all days in 
a currency pair. The column Events reports the number of significant ManIx for both ask and bid. The 
column E/DD is the percentage of significant ManIx occurrence that has been calculated by dividing 
Events by Dealer-Day. 
 
Figure 1 - Example of Statistical Verification through Bootstrapping 
 
Figure 1 illustrates a simulation distribution for one dealer day for RBS New York. The realized ManIx 
for RBS New York on June 21st, 2013 is equal to 17, which lies within the top 5% of the bootstrapping 
distribution. Since this value stands at the top 5% of the bootstrapping, the behavior of RBS New York 






Figure 2 – Manipulative Networks 
Panel A. EUR:GBP 
 
 














Panel C. EUR:USD  
 
Panel D. GBP:USD  
 
Panel E: USD:JPY  
 
 
This figure illustrates the identified network of manipulators for each of the five currency pairs. In order 
to identify the network of manipulators, the network connection and strength is determined by the 
number of the times that any two banks have a significant ManIx for a currency pair on a same day. 
The weight on each link demonstrates the number of days that a specific pair of dealers may have 
colluded together. The grey, black, and grey dashed lines illustrate collusion between dealers in 






1 The economic importance of the WMR fix rate arises from its application in the valuation of equity portfolios 
and derivatives (Evans 2018). 
2 On June 12, 2013, Bloomberg news reported that traders in five banks manipulated the fix rate affecting 
$3,600,000,000,000 assets “in funds including pension and savings accounts that track global indexes” (Vaughan 
et al, 2013). The breaking of this news triggered 20 investigations in 10 countries and the European Union 
(Bloomberg Visual Data 2015) resulting in $11,800,000,000 fines as of December 2015. 
 
3 The Bank for International Settlement’s estimated share of automated spot trading in the FX market is 24.7% of 
$4.124 billion (BIS 2011). Rime and Schrimpf (2013 p.40) report that “EBS estimates that around 30%-35% of 
volume on its trading platform is HFT-driven.” 
4 See section 2.1 for further discussion of the quote driven nature of the FX market. 
5 Although the Electronic Broker System (EBS) is known as the main venue for the price discovery of the Euro 
and Yen (Cabrera et al, 2009), Thomson Reuters claims that it matches the venues that are providing liquidity in 
the EBS (Thomson Reuters 2014). 
 
6 From February 2015, the fixing period has increased from 1 minute (60 seconds) to 5 minutes (300 seconds). 
 
7 It is difficult to observe dealers’ real intentions. In practice, we use the observed final median as a measure of 
dealers’ manipulation targets. This design captures only successful manipulative attempts. In other words, our 
approach is a conservative estimate of the true manipulation in the market. 
 
8 Such a bootstrap design also has the important benefit of controlling for a size effect as we discuss later in the 
methodology session. 
 
9 Although we take great comfort that the banks identified via our methodology are close to the regulatory 
investigations’ findings, we recognize that there may be false positives in our test. Not all the banks that we have 
identified have been investigated by the regulators. Whether or not these are false positive will only be found if 
regulators initiate investigations and release their findings. 
 
10 “In response to the rapidly changing financial landscape the FCA set up Project Innovate and so regulators are 
working to keep up with new business models entering the financial system” (Government Office for Science 
2015). 
11 See section 2.1 for further details. 
 
12 These two ways that a quote becomes a trade shows that every trade is not necessarily executed at the best price. 
 
13 Explanatory memorandum to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 (regulated activities) (amendment) 
order 2015 no. 369, section 2, by HM treasury. 
 
14 “WM performs tolerance checks at the time the data are sourced and again after the calculation of the benchmark 
is complete. This may result in some captured data being excluded from the fix calculation.” (The World Market 
Company 2015). Though the mid-price Fix rate is the most common form of use, the Fix rate is published as bid 
and ask prices. As a result, in our methodology we also examine the bid and ask quotes separately to analyze the 
behavior of dealers. 
 
15 It is possible to quote a price lower than the current median while higher than the last quote price. Such a quote 
would be a less effective manipulation than a down tick quote (a quote that has a quote price lower than the 
previous quote price). 
 
16 The division of 1 by 0.1334 yields 7.5, which means 1 quote out of 7.5 quotes contribute to fix rate discovery. 
17 Note that only dealers that have at least one significant ManIx are included in the list. 
 
18 We remove the 15:59 because 30 seconds of the fixing window falls in this minute. 
 
19 Although some examples of these banks’ manipulations were published by the FCA, there is no comprehensive 
information on the currencies that they manipulated. 
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20 Similarly, BoA and BNP Paribas are not in our database. These banks are more active in the EBS platform. 
21 Since manipulative quotes in each given fix section has a common target median, banks having significant 
manipulative behaviors can be seen as having common intended manipulative goal. 
